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OBERGEFELL’S CONSERVATISM:
REIFYING FAMILIAL FRONTS
Clare Huntington*
I am delighted with the result in Obergefell v. Hodges,1 but I am unhappy
with the Court’s reasoning.2 In lieu of a straightforward, and far more
defensible, decision based purely on the Equal Protection Clause,3 Justice
Kennedy’s reliance on the Due Process Clause is deeply problematic.
A substantive due process analysis required the Court to define marriage
and explain its social importance. This meant the Court had to choose
between competing images—social fronts—of marriage. If it had used an
equal protection analysis, the Court would not have had to decide whether
marriage is traditional or marriage is more plural. Instead, the Court would
have espoused a thinner notion of marriage—that, whatever its essential
nature, marriage must be available on equal grounds unless the state can
convincingly argue otherwise. An equal protection analysis also would
have obviated the need for Justice Kennedy’s paean to marriage.
There are two lamentable consequences of the Court’s framing. It
unnecessarily disrespects people who in good faith have a different view of
the social front of marriage. And it reifies marriage as a key element in the
social front of family, further marginalizing nonmarital families.4
* Professor and Associate Dean for Research, Fordham University School of Law.
1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2. I laid out my concern about basing marriage equality on the Due Process Clause
rather than the Equal Protection Clause before Obergefell was decided. See Clare
Huntington, Staging the Family, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 646–49 (2013). As I explain in this
Essay, Obergefell confirmed that I was right to worry. See infra Parts I, II.
3. Justice Kennedy, in his majority opinion for the Court, did invoke the Equal
Protection Clause as an additional basis for its holding, see Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602–
05, but the equal protection analysis is very thin, see id. at 2623 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(“The majority does not seriously engage with [the equal protection] claim. Its discussion is,
quite frankly, difficult to follow.”).
4. There are other problems with the opinion as well, some of which also flow from the
decision to rest the opinion primarily on the Due Process Clause. For example, marriage
equality is an important substantive and symbolic victory for promoting equal treatment of
LGBT individuals, but the majority opinion is unnecessarily anchored to marriage. If the
Court had seen discrimination in marriage as part of a larger question about equal
citizenship, all LGBT individuals would have benefitted. A more robust LGBT rights
agenda would include protection from discrimination in employment, housing, and much
more. Support the Equality Act, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/campaigns/
support-the-equality-act (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) (“Even after a marriage victory at the
Supreme Court, in most states in this country, a couple who gets married at 10 a.m. remains
at risk of being fired from their jobs by noon and evicted from their home by 2 p.m. simply
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I. THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL FRONTS
Justice Kennedy framed the majority’s analysis as a struggle between
competing social fronts of marriage, with the Court as the arbiter. To
understand what this means and why it is problematic, let me back up.
As I have written elsewhere,5 family law is performative. That is,
iterated, everyday performances of family roles—from wearing a wedding
ring to sending holiday cards—create and then maintain collective
understandings of categories such as mother, father, child, and family itself.
Think about presidential candidates crossing the stage with their smiling,
opposite-sex spouses and biological or adopted children.
These
performances send a message about the centrality of the traditional, nuclear
family in our culture. Or think about school pick-up time, when the
playground is filled with mothers and female babysitters.
These
performances send a message about the role of women as primary
caregivers.
Over time, these performances shape what the sociologist Erving
Goffman called a social front—a shorthand for conveying information
about a category of people.6 A woman pushing a stroller is a mother. A
man throwing a ball to a young child is a father. Almost by definition,
social fronts tend to be narrow, reflecting the typical and sometimes
idealized performance.
Social fronts change over time, but the way they typically change is
through other, iterated performances. When politicians reflect other family
structures,7 it sends a message about the potential faces for “family.” And
when fathers begin to pick up children from school, their performances may
initiate, even if only fitfully, the slow process of changing the social front of
fatherhood.8
The law plays a role in this process, drawing on and often reinforcing
social fronts. When deciding whether the Constitution should protect the
relationship between an unmarried father and his child, for example, the
for posting their wedding photos on Facebook.”) [http://perma.cc/5CFD-5E68]. An opinion
based solely on the Equal Protection Clause, and not “the transcendent importance of
marriage,” would have sent the message that equal citizenship is about more than marriage.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594. Additionally, there would have been greater clarity with
respect to the level of scrutiny applicable to laws and actions that treat LGBT individuals
differently from heterosexual individuals.
5. See Huntington, supra note 2.
6. See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 26–27 (1959).
Wearing a white laboratory coat, for example, conveys a general message of cleanliness and
modernity to the audience without fleshing out the details of precisely how this particular
professional is clean and modern. See id. at 26.
7. Former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, for example, has a long-time
companion who accompanied him to many official events. See Michael Cooper, City’s ‘First
Lady’ to Leave State Position for Private Firm, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/15/nyregion/15diana.html [http://perma.cc/3CNW-J65H].
8. See Darren Rosenblum, Unsex Mothering: Toward a New Culture of Parenting, 35
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 57, 58–78 (2012) (describing the multiple “ways in which legal and
social norms configure parenting as a sexed endeavor,” with mothers understood as the
primary parent and fathers as peripheral caregivers, but also offering solutions for changing
these norms).
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Supreme Court looked to the dominant social front of fatherhood—
breadwinning—to judge whether the would-be fathers deserved legal
recognition.9 By making this marker of fatherhood legally salient, the
Court reinforced the social front of fatherhood: fathers are men who
provide for their children.
The law can also play a role in altering a social front. When Sweden
changed its parental leave policy to encourage more fathers with young
children to take time off, for example, this helped shift the social front of
fatherhood, with men more likely to combine careers with caregiving.10
It is more fraught, however, when a court, as opposed to a legislature,
chooses between competing social fronts. Marriage equality is a good
example.
The debate over marriage equality was fundamentally about controlling
the meaning—the social front—of marriage. Advocates of marriage
equality wanted access to the tangible and intangible benefits of marriage,
but they knew the way to get there was by hewing closely to the existing
social front of marriage. Thus, advocates carefully selected plaintiffs and
crafted media campaigns that preserved the core of the social front.
Lesbians and gay men were portrayed as long-term, committed partners and
parents who sought nothing more than normalcy—to be a soccer mom or to
say grace before a family dinner.11 Framed this way, the claim for legal
recognition was not so great a demand. The advocates did not want to
change marriage, they simply wanted access to it.12
Social conservatives, in turn, believed that allowing same-sex couples to
marry would drastically change the social front of marriage. From their
9. See Huntington, supra note 2, at 620–21 (discussing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983)). The Court thus took a narrow, idealized
social front, cemented it into the legal category of “father,” and then invoked this
construction to judge all aspirant fathers. Breadwinning is still the dominant social front of
fatherhood. See Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for
Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 210–11 (2015) (discussing the continuing norm
of fathers as breadwinners).
10. See Alicia Brokars Kelly, Navigating Gender in Modern Intimate Partnership Law,
14 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 38–39 (2012) (discussing the changes in Sweden’s law and noting
both its relative success as well as limitations in equalizing caregiving responsibilities
between men and women); Katrin Bennhold, In Sweden, Men Can Have It All, N.Y. TIMES
(June 9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/world/europe/10iht-sweden.html?_r=0
(describing the changes in social norms after the change in the law) [http://perma.cc/2GJP76K5].
11. Natalie Wilson, From Gestation to Delivery: The Embodied Activist Mothering of
Cindy Sheehan and Jennifer Schumaker, in MOTHERS WHO DELIVER:
FEMINIST
INTERVENTIONS IN PUBLIC AND INTERPERSONAL DISCOURSE 231, 243 (Jocelyn Fenton Stitt &
Pegeen Reichert Powell eds., 2010) (describing the “500 Mile Walk for Togetherness” by
Jennifer Schumaker, a lesbian who called herself a “lesbian soccer mom,” in an effort “to
create a sustainable link between forces that wish to ‘other’ her”); GetToKnowUsFirst.org,
Xavier & Michael, YOUTUBE (Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SeK_wGyHD8 (depicting a happy, functional two-father family playing basketball and saying
grace before dinner) [http://perma.cc/X3B5-4N7L].
12. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (“It would misunderstand
these men and women to say they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is that they do
respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for themselves.”).
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perspective, if the social front of marriage was no longer one man and one
woman, it would be that much harder for conservatives to teach their
children that men and women have distinct roles to play in family life.13
Families could teach this lesson at home, but it would be more difficult to
do so if the social front of marriage did not reflect a traditional gender
division.14
When courts and legislatures decided whether, as a matter of policy or
constitutional necessity, same-sex couples should be allowed to marry,
these legal institutions weighed in on the dispute over the social front of
marriage.
But courts and legislatures are not similarly situated when it comes to
making these decisions. It is one thing for a legislative proposal or a ballot
initiative to determine the social front of marriage, because those processes
allow multiple voices and sustained debate about this sensitive social issue.
By contrast, it is more problematic for the judiciary to choose the
appropriate social front.
And yet Justice Kennedy did exactly this. By basing its opinion
primarily on the Due Process Clause, the Court had to define marriage and
then ask whether LGBT individuals could be excluded from it. Justice
Kennedy argued that allowing same-sex couples to marry would not
drastically alter the social front of marriage. As he stated:
Were their intent to demean the revered idea and reality of marriage,
the petitioners’ claims would be of a different order. But that is neither
their purpose nor their submission. To the contrary, it is the enduring
importance of marriage that underlies the petitioners’ contentions. . . . Far
from seeking to devalue marriage, the petitioners seek it for themselves
because of their respect—and need—for its privileges and
responsibilities.15

In other words, same-sex couples are no different from opposite-sex
couples, and because there are good reasons to allow same-sex couples to
marry (such as conferring dignity and providing benefits), the state cannot
prevent them from doing so.16
All this may be true, but who is Justice Kennedy to choose between
competing social fronts? It is hardly surprising that Chief Justice Roberts
raised charges of judicial activism.17 The objections in his dissent can be
13. See id. at 2594 (“To them, it would demean a timeless institution if the concept and
lawful status of marriage were extended to two persons of the same sex. Marriage, in their
view, is by its nature a gender-differentiated union of man and woman.”).
14. Ken Blackwell, Civil Unions and True Marriage, WORLD (Aug. 24, 2012, 5:31 PM),
http://www.worldmag.com/2012/08/civil_unions_and_true_marriage (describing the dangers
of allowing same-sex couples to marry, including the concern that “schoolchildren [will be]
proselytized in the early grades [with] the new definition of marriage”) [http://perma.cc/
HP7U-5Y85].
15. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594.
16. Id. at 2599 (“The four principles and traditions to be discussed demonstrate that the
reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex
couples.”).
17. Id. at 2611–12 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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understood as a criticism of the Court choosing one social front over
another.18
A more persuasive, and arguably less provocative, way to uphold the
right of same-sex couples to marry would have been to base the decision
purely on the Equal Protection Clause. In an equality analysis, the Court
would not have overtly chosen between social fronts. The Court would
have concluded that regardless of the social meaning of marriage, states
cannot deny access to it based on sexual orientation absent a rational,
important, or compelling state interest. In this way, the Court would not
have defined the proper social front of marriage, but instead determined the
permissible grounds for state classifications.19
As a matter of institutional competence, courts are much better suited to
the task of evaluating claims of equality and discrimination than choosing
between contested social fronts.
Moreover, there are significant
disadvantages to the framing the Court chose, as the next two parts explore.
II. AN UNNECESSARY FIGHT
In reality, marriage equality was a fight over the social front of marriage,
but Justice Kennedy framed the legal question in these terms as well. By
doing so, he unnecessarily provoked social conservatives. I am not arguing
that the Court should have avoided the constitutional issue. I disagree with
Chief Justice Roberts that this issue should have been left to the political
process. Rather, my point is that there was an alternative path for reaching
the same conclusion and that taking the other route would have been more
respectful of both sides.
An equal protection analysis would have acknowledged the stakes at play
for both advocates and opponents of marriage equality. The Court would
have found a constitutional basis for marriage equality without explicitly
choosing one social front over another and thus disparaging social
conservatives who felt that their own public conception of marriage was
threatened. It would have been more respectful to say to social

18. See id. at 2611 (“But this Court is not a legislature. Whether same-sex marriage is a
good idea should be of no concern to us. Under the Constitution, judges have power to say
what the law is, not what it should be.”); id. (“Although the policy arguments for extending
marriage to same-sex couples may be compelling, the legal arguments for requiring such an
extension are not. The fundamental right to marry does not include a right to make a State
change its definition of marriage.”); id. at 2612 (“The majority’s decision is an act of will,
not legal judgment. The right it announces has no basis in the Constitution or this Court’s
precedent. The majority expressly disclaims judicial ‘caution’ and omits even a pretense of
humility, openly relying on its desire to remake society according to its own ‘new insight’
into the ‘nature of injustice.’”).
19. The dissent by Chief Justice Roberts intimated that targeted claims under the Equal
Protection Clause might have been more persuasive to him, too. See id. at 2623 (rejecting a
basic equal protection claim because state law “distinguishing between opposite-sex and
same-sex couples is rationally related to the States’ ‘legitimate state interest’ in ‘preserving
the traditional institution of marriage,’” but noting that “[t]he equal protection analysis might
be different, in my view, if we were confronted with a more focused challenge to the denial
of certain tangible benefits”).
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conservatives, “We understand your views on marriage, but equality
principles require opening marriage to same-sex couples.”20
To be sure, the effect of an equal protection analysis would still have
been a change in the social front of marriage, and social conservatives
would likely still have felt a strong sense of loss. But the rationale for the
loss—that equality demands equal access, not that marriage is X—would
have acknowledged multiple social conceptions of marriage while still
upholding the Constitution.
By defining marriage as more plural, the Court said to social
conservatives that this is what the institution means, not just legally, but
also culturally. In an equality analysis, the Court would have said that
whatever marriage means culturally, a state cannot deny access to it without
distinctions that have a state (as opposed to a private, cultural) interest as a
basis. In other words, the problem is that Justice Kennedy gave the Court
the power to change not only the law but also the culture.
III. AN UNNECESSARY DENIGRATION
Justice Kennedy’s opinion is not only an affront to (some) people within
the institution of marriage, but also to individuals outside the institution.21
Far from the marble halls of the Supreme Court, marriage is not a central
feature of family life in many communities. Marriage rates remain strong
for college-educated individuals, but they are steadily declining for those
with less education and income.22 As a result, many children—40 percent

20. Moreover, equality principles are at the heart of the American legal system and
therefore would have been more persuasive than claims based on the transcendence of
marriage. Indeed, one of the most resonant arguments in the marriage equality movement
has been the comparison of domestic partnership regimes to racial “separate but equal” laws.
See, e.g., Governor Christine Gregoire, Marriage Equality Speech (Jan. 4, 2012),
http://www.digitalarchives.wa.gov/GovernorGregoire/speeches/speech-view.asp?SpeechSeq
=222 (“While I understand the experiences of racial minorities and lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender Americans are not identical, laws that keep some Americans in a separate
status are inherently unjust.”) [http://perma.cc/AT6A-YUK5].
These arguments
immediately and intuitively—if also problematically—illustrate how restricting marriage to
opposite-sex couples is discriminatory. See e.g., R.A. Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez v.
Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law, and the Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 96 CAL. L. REV. 839,
879–99 (2008) (arguing that the analogy obscures more than it illuminates and that scholars
and advocates should focus on the many ways “identity-based restrictions . . . have served
primarily to police and restrain expressions of identity and, ultimately, the range of
possibilities for human intimacy”).
21. This discussion focuses on the effect of Obergefell on a particular demographic
group—low-income, unmarried adults with shared children. For a critical discussion of the
implications of marriage equality within LGBT communities, see Katherine M. Franke,
Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2688–89 (2008) (arguing that marriage
equality advocacy risks “denigrating or shrinking an affective sexual liberty outside of
marriage” and that the legal recognition of same-sex marriage risks bringing same-sex
relationships within the constraints of heterosexual relationships, further marginalizing a
conception of intimacy and desire not based on marriage).
22. For a book length treatment of this subject, see NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE,
MARRIAGE MARKETS (2014).
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nationally23—are born to unmarried parents, most of whom will never
marry each other.24
In addition to choosing the social front of marriage, the opinion in
Obergefell reified the social front of family as the marital family. By
basing the opinion on the Due Process Clause, Justice Kennedy had to
glorify marriage.25 And he did, choosing very traditional language.
According to Justice Kennedy, marriage is “a keystone of our social
order,”26 it “embodies the highest ideals of . . . family,”27 and it “is essential
to our most profound hopes and aspirations.”28 Also according to Justice
Kennedy, the importance of marriage is likewise felt by children:
“[M]arriage allows children ‘to understand the integrity and closeness of
their own family and its concord with other families in their community and
Without “the recognition, stability, and
in their daily lives.’”29
predictability marriage offers, . . . children suffer the stigma of knowing
their families are somehow lesser. . . . The marriage laws at issue here thus
harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples.”30 These sweeping
statements about the place of marriage in legitimizing a family are harmful
both rhetorically and substantively.
The legal system already does far too little to support nonmarital
families,31 and Justice Kennedy’s opinion reinforces the notion that these
families are deviant. Every statement that Justice Kennedy makes for the
Court can be read as an implicit criticism: a nonmarital family is not the
keystone of the social order; it does not embody the ideal of family; and it is
not essential to profound hopes and aspirations. And, by extension,
nonmarital children are necessarily humiliated by their parents’ lack of
formal marital status.
Nonmarital families face many challenges, and there is considerable
evidence that children of unmarried parents have worse outcomes than
children of married parents.32 But much of this is due to the factors that
23. See Brady E. HAMILTON ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, BIRTHS: PRELIMINARY
DATA FOR 2014 4 (2014), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr64/nvsr64_06.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2537-B8A9].
24. Sara S. McLanahan & Irwin Garfinkel, Fragile Families: Debates, Facts, and
Solutions, in MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS: LAW, POLICY, AND THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF
TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FAMILIES 145–47 (Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott eds.,
2012) (discussing a landmark study that found that more than 80 percent of unmarried
parents are romantically involved at the time of birth but that these relationships typically do
not endure).
25. This is because the Due Process Clause requires the identification of a fundamental
right. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–98 (2015). In other words, Justice
Kennedy had to emphasize the importance of marriage to explain why excluding LGBT
individuals was so injurious.
26. Id. at 2601.
27. Id. at 2608.
28. Id. at 2594.
29. Id. at 2600 (quoting Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013)).
30. 135 S. Ct. at 2600–01.
31. I have explored this issue at length elsewhere. See generally Huntington, supra note
9.
32. See id. at 196.
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tend to accompany nonmarital childbearing, notably lower incomes and
lower parental education.33 Justice Kennedy’s opinion makes too much of
marital status as a marker of integrity and belonging.34
As a substantive matter, Justice Kennedy’s framing reinforces family
law’s neglect of nonmarital families. The problem with family law is that it
places marriage at the foundation of legal regulation. Family law is really
marital family law, and it is deeply problematic for nonmarital families,
undermining relationships in nonmarital families in several distinct ways.
First, marital family law’s doctrine pushes fathers out of families,
allowing mothers to control fathers’ access to shared children.35 It also
exacerbates conflict in families through child support laws that are designed
for divorcing families.36
Second, marital family law has developed legal institutions that work
relatively well for married families but not at all for unmarried families.
Marital family law presumes that couples will go to court at the end of
relationships, but unmarried couples do not need the state to end their
relationships, and most cannot afford to go to court to formalize issues such
as custody.37 This means that unmarried parents are left without an
effective institution to help them transition from a family based on a
romantic relationship to a family based on co-parenting. Thus, unmarried
parents do not have the benefit of clearly established expectations for their
rights and responsibilities following a breakup.38
Finally, marital family law—especially through child support and
custody rules—reinforces traditional gender norms that are starkly at odds
with the reality of nonmarital family life. Most unmarried fathers struggle
to support their children economically, and most unmarried mothers are
both full-time caregivers and breadwinners.39 The dominant social front of
fathers as breadwinners renders unmarried fathers failures, undermining
their place in the family by telling mothers and children that fathers are not
acting as they should. In all these ways, marital family law weakens the
already tenuous bonds that tie nonmarital families together.

33. See id. at 197–98.
34. See generally R.A. Lenhardt, Marriage As Black Citizenship?, 66 HASTINGS L.J.
1317 (2015) (describing a more robust notion of citizenship that does not derive wholly from
marriage); see also R.A. Lenhardt, Integrating Legal Marriage, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 761
(2012) (warning that the dominant marriage equality strategy of distinguishing deserving
families from undeserving families risked further marginalizing nondominant families).
35. Huntington, supra note 9, at 202–09.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 209–10.
38. Id. at 210.
39. Id. at 210–11.
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CONCLUSION
There is much more the law can and should do to support and strengthen
nonmarital families,40 but we need to take this work seriously, beginning
with where families are and not assuming marriage is the prescription for
all that ails American families.
Justice Kennedy’s denigration of nonmarital families, even if
unintentional, is deeply troubling. By reifying the social front of family as
children with married parents, and by penning an unnecessary paean to
marriage, Justice Kennedy made the lives of nonmarital families lesser. An
opinion based on the Equal Protection Clause would not have had to elevate
marriage and, in the process, devalue nonmarital families.
In an era when marriage has become a marker of socioeconomic status,
Obergefell has the effect of further entrenching the divide between marital
and nonmarital families. Rather than marginalize nonmarital families, the
law needs to strengthen and support these families. Obergefell makes it that
much harder to do so.
My intention is not to rain on the marriage equality parade. I am thrilled
with the outcome, and I am proud to live in a country that embraces
marriage equality. But I look forward to the day when we can celebrate
opinions that embrace equality and belonging for all families.

40. Id. at 225–36 (proposing changes to family law). See generally CLARE HUNTINGTON,
FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS (2014) (proposing
more broad-based changes).

